Re: Concept_sitting

Deux choses que je partage:
*effectivement une telle langue, aux racines limitées en nombre, est
presque obligatoirement, disons automatiquement, une langue
contextuelle.
*et la remarque de Gödel se confirme parfaitement en Udwesa, où
depuis longtemps j'ai une sorte de "particule vide" (grammatical
empty box), deux aujourd'hui en fait...

Si chaque peuple a ses représentations, tu as raison,
nous sommes tous constitués de de mains, deux pieds, nous ingérons et
nous débarrassons (get rid) des aliments par les mêmes orifices, nous
avons tous une terre en dessous de nous et un ciel au dessus, tous
les peuples comptent des femmes et des enfants, pleurent, meurent et
naissent ...  (cf Natural_semantic_metalanguage, cf mythology, ...)

ce qui m'intéresse c'est ce que nous avons en commun
pas ce qui nous sépare
et ensuite c'est une sorte de jeu
comment exprimer x ou y avec ces éléments ?
en imaginant que je n'en ai pas d'autre.
...
chacun ses préoccupations.


Le 16 janv. 09 à 04:22, Sai Emrys a écrit :

> If I may put a cogsci twist on the discussion...
>
> It seems to me that words *cannot* ever be fully defined concepts. For
> this reason, they cannot ever be atomic; there is always some further
> division of meaning that can be made, as there is always further
> definition that has not yet been elaborated and excised in previous
> cuttings.
>
> The reason is that all concepts, indeed all communication, depend on a
> shared experience between the people talking.
>
> Gödel, for example, proved that any (mathematical) system necessarily
> has certain axioms that cannot be proved within that system. They must
> simply be accepted, or not; if one does not accept them, then no
> fruitful discussion can be had - they're not things one can argue to
> be correct without going into a homunculus fallacy.
>
> This is true of languages as well. Any "atomic" idea that one might
> want are necessarily not truly atomic; calling them so is, at best, an
> axiom that one may or may not share with others.
>
> For this reason, any ontology of language - any list of semantic
> primes - is at best a list of axioms. Someone else can always come to
> that list and say, "I view this as actually a combination of things".
>
> If this were not true, it wouldn't be easily possible to define the
> word. Definitions are, as it were, a tweezing apart of the meaning in
> the word.
>
> So, IMHO, any ontology is doomed that does not acknowledge this, and
> does not acknowledge that:
> a) choices of how to divide or define a concept are necessarily
> arbitrary; and
> b) choices of what concepts to adopt as 'atomic' are equally
> arbitrary.
>
> Being arbitrary is OK. Conlangers do that all the time; eventually one
> decides what goals one has, what one considers to be aesthetically
> pleasing, how to balance choices that require tradeoffs. These things
> cannot be really justified more than, at root, they feel right.
>
> So yes, you can create a language based on semantic "primes". Indeed,
> I think it's a useful idea; it gives rise to elegance like Arabic's
> triconsontal semantic roots.
>
> It simply will not ever be universal, and chasing universality -
> chasing some sort of Truth of semantic primacy - will only lead one
> into yet another form of qabbalah or OTO.
>
> The world has enough of those, IMO.
>
> - Sai