Re: THEORY: Are commands to believe infelicitous?

Thanks to both David J. Peterson and Joseph Bridwell for responding.

Does anyone know of a NatLang that has a "working hypothesis"
evidential or modal?

--- In conlang@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Bridwell <zhosh@2...> wrote:
> > I propose that any imperative form of the
> > verb "to believe" is infelicitous unless
> > spoken to a computer.
>
> In general, I agree if I ignore the issues of mental capability,
and
> what "believe" might or might not mean to someone else. "love" is a
> similar verb for me.
>
Yes, that makes sense.  People as we now know them are mostly
constitutionally unable to obey a command to love.

> > I propose that natural humans cannot consciously
> > choose whether or not to believe certain
> > propositions in the face of evidence to the contrary,
> > nor in the absence of evidence in favor.
>
> How are you defining "natural humans"? Those falling within the
> means of mental & physical bell-curve? Being untouched by any
> society and pressures? ?
>
By "natural human" I simply meant not a robot nor an android.  On
this list (or should I say in this group) I didn't feel I should
limit myself to humanity as it has been constituted so far.

> I believe that the average man on the street does indeed "believe"
> regardless of contrary evidence or absence of evidence. I myself
do:
> I choose to believe that consciousness survives death since to
> believe otherwise implies to me meaninglessness to my actions past,
> present and future. Thus, for me, "believe" and "need" have a
closer
> connection; and further, that solid evidence changes belief into
> fact for whomever accepts the evidence.
>
Can you explain this "choosing" to believe?
When I look at the cover of Strong's Concordance on my right, I see
that it is white.  I cannot choose to believe that it is blue unless
there is something wrong with my color vision.  I can choose not to
look at it at all; or to turn out the light; or to cover it up; but
I can not choose to see it as another color than white.
If I touch it, I feel it is smooth and dry.  I cannot make myself
feel it as rough and damp unless there is something wrong with my
sense of touch.  I can only choose not to touch it in the first
place.
Likewise, if I pick it up, I feel it has a certain weight.  I cannot
feel it is heavier or lighter without some defect of my
proprioceptive sense.  I can only choose not to feel its weight in
the first place.
---
I think the "choosing to believe" you are talking about is similar
to what one does in Contract Bridge.  If the cards have to be
distributed in a certain way in order for you to make your contract,
play as if they are distributed that way.  In other words, adopt as
a working hypothesis that it is possible for you to win -- and use
that as a basis for your strategy -- since, (1) any other strategy
will guarantee you lose, and (2) if it is false you would have lost
anyway.
That is a case of believing, in the absence of sufficient evidence
in favor, something you need to believe; but also in the absence of
sufficient evidence against.  People do believe, or act as if they
believe, things for which there is some, but not enough, evidence.
To what degree are they actually "choosing to believe"?  I think it
is easier to choose to act as if I believe, than to choose to
believe.

> > Does anyone know of various ways various
> > languages have handled different versions
> > of ideas similar to "to choose to believe"?
> > Perhaps by different voices (middle voice
> > maybe), different moods, or just different verbs?
>
> IIRC, some Austronesian languages use evidence morphemes: e.g.
> directly evident to anyone, directly experienced by the speaker,
> told to the speaker by another, hypothetical/dreamed by the
speaker,
> etc.
>
I'm very interested in evidentials, which I think should be regarded
as a branch of epistemic modality.  I hadn't thought of them as part
of this question.
(Epistemology is about the question "How can you be so sure?" which
divides into "Just how sure are you, exactly?" and "How do you
know?")

If I recall correctly, some North American languages have
evidentials distinguishing between (1) what is directly evident to
the senses or to memory, (2) what is clearly and immediately
deducible from (1), (3) other ...

I think such a language might make beliefs in category (1) or (2)
not subject to choice or command.  There probably is a NatLang that
has a "working hypothesis" evidential or modal; does anyone know of
one?  Beliefs in that category would IMO be subject to choice, and
might be subject to command as well.

> > How is the commandment to believe, and/or
> > the choice to believe, handled in various
> > languages?  How SHOULD it be handled in a
> > conlang?
>
> Should? However the creator of that conlang choses. Do you
> mean "might"?
I guess I meant "what would be the best way?"  By "best" I guess I
would have meant "most productive of new ideas, variations,
situations, etc. for fiction and/or role-play".
Anyhow I think one possible lead has been suggested by you.  A
language with evidentials could segregate "beliefs" of the sort that
are directly evident to the senses or to memory, or directly
deducible from those, from "beliefs" that are adopted as working
hypotheses because, for instance, if they are false then no strategy
will work anyway.  That may be better than my idea of having
the "choose to believe" verb have a middle voice but no active voice.

Thank you.

----
Tom H.C. in OK

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