projective vs. injective

well as i said before, what you try to describe things i distinguish with the
dualism projektive terms and injektive terms.
injektive are terms which map obvious manifestations.
-
projektive are terms which doesnt map obvious manifestations.
 - scientific measures
 - terms of logic
 - spatial directions
..
injektive are terms which map the obbvious manifestations
- mental prozesses
- devices
- materials
- radioactivity
etc..

both has nothing to do with "concrete vs. abstract"
or "subjective vs. objective".
projections of the human mind are not useless but you can redefine
them easily.
injektive terms are fix defined by environment.

if you think strictly you could say language itself with all its terms
is projektive but i use these terms to distinguish terms,
for non linguistic philosophical distinction i prefer
to use the term "manifestation" to describe things which directly
exist and "non-manifestation" for things which dont,
so language is a non manifestation.
if you think further strictly ou could argue that thoughts itself are
manifestation (because theyre obviously existant)
so thoughts of terms must be manifestations too.
this is a philosophical discussion i had before,
somwhere you must draw the border when you dont want to use those term
relativistically only.
and that its possible to draw the border should be clear.
even if the border is fuzzy, everyone will at least understand the
principle and its more extreme forms.

the word "arbitrary" doesnt fit very well aince  it implies something
"planless" or "random", at least as connotation.
there is simply need for new terms, not only inthis case.
thats all for now.
and please overlook my grammarhammers :-) i dont claim do speak or
write perfect english, thats rather irrelevant for me :-)
regards,
c.s.
TRW> Herman Miller wrote:

>> On Mon, 13 Aug 2001 08:24:30 -0500, "Thomas R. Wier"
>> <artabanos@...> wrote:
>>
>> >There is, for example, no such thing as a 'fish';  there are only individual
>> >entities which we to greater or lesser degrees choose to categorize in
>> >the slot arbitrarily marked 'fish'.  Where we draw the line between one
>> >category and another is entirely up to us, and not something that we can
>> >find out through the world around us.  All this means that any word you
>> >choose to use will be semantically ambiguous, because you could be more
>> >specific in refering to a particular entity, rather than to the type.
>>
>> Not entirely up to us ... well, in theory someone might put elephants in
>> the "fish" category and clams in the "bird" category, but no one would see
>> those as "natural" categories. Whether or not to include sharks or whales
>> in the "fish" category is a matter of opinion, but there are limits beyond
>> which it starts making less and less sense to extend the boundaries of the
>> category. Even color categories, which you might expect to be arbitrary,
>> seem to have some natural basis in the process of human color vision.
>> Still, in most cases there's no obvious place to draw the line between
>> categories.
TRW> And that's the crux of the matter. I normally do not like the law of the
TRW> excluded middle, since it so often results in reductionist absurdities, but
TRW> in this case, I can see no alternative to it:  to me, it is either up to us, or
TRW> not at all, because "up-to-us"ness is an abstraction that appropriately
TRW> captures human freedom of will, even though most abstractions usually
TRW> gloss over the complexities of reality to achieve something that makes
TRW> people feel they understand it. So, to me, saying that it is not ultimately
TRW> up to us to decide where one category should begin and where another
TRW> ends sounds tantamount to saying that we do not also have the freedom
TRW> to choose what categories are and are not useful for our perception of
TRW> reality.  It does not seem to me a question of whether we can perceive
TRW> some kind of external reality, as I am no solipsist, but rather how that
TRW> reality is encoded in language.  In a certain sense I agree here with the
TRW> Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in that I think many people are fooled by not
TRW> making a distinction between the arbitrary linguistic value something in
TRW> the world has, and the semantic notions we associate with it. As Zhuangzi
TRW> said, you do not point to the moon and confuse your finger for it; but why
TRW> do people do that so often with language?

TRW> An aside:  you know what I should do?  Create a conlang where all
TRW> discussion of metaphysics is physically impossible, because it will cause
TRW> you to have a fatal seizure.  <yuck>  I feel dirty now.

>> >(And therein rests my apologia of artlanging.  Here I stand; I can do
>> >no other.)
>> >
>> >It is for these reasons that I gave up on Degaspregos as a profoundly
>> >naive attempt to systematize and organize the world through language.
>> >I decided though that rather than obliterating the work as a failure, a
>> >greater testament to that failure would be to leave it be, unchanged
>> >and incomplete, analogous to the way that logical systems must be
>> >incomplete.
>>
>> Organization isn't easy. I've given up on creating vast organized lists of
>> vocabulary (as I've tried in Eklektu, Ludireo, Tilya, and Czirehlat, among
>> others), but I still find it useful to organize words systematically in
>> limited semantic areas.
TRW> I dunno.  The problem for me has never been creating the organization, per
TRW> se, but rather it was determining what level of organization should be or even
TRW> could be encoded.  I mean, could we not encode not just a given object's
TRW> relationship to other given objects, but also the given object's entire internal
TRW> atomic chemistry, every historical position in at least four dimensions of each
TRW> atom since the beginning of the universe, and who it slept with last night?  To
TRW> me, there seems to be no nonarbitrary way to say what kinds of information
TRW> must be encoded in a language's grammar and what must not.  (Indeed, this
TRW> forms the basis of Alexander Carstairs-McCarthy's theory on the origin of
TRW> human language, which proceeds from the question of why human language
TRW> syntax fundamentally distinguishes NPs and VPs, since there seems no inherent
TRW> reason for it to do so outside the course of human evolution that we have actually
TRW> taken.)

TRW> It is for this reason that I turned to artlanging, since, if the form of language is
TRW> an arbitrary artefact of human culture and evolution, this meaninglessness can
TRW> at least be combatted by reveling in it, as we do with dance and song and art.

TRW> ===================================
TRW> Thomas Wier | AIM: trwier

TRW> "Aspidi men Saiôn tis agalletai, hên para thamnôi
TRW>   entos amômêton kallipon ouk ethelôn;
TRW> autos d' exephugon thanatou telos: aspis ekeinê
TRW>   erretô; exautês ktêsomai ou kakiô" - Arkhilokhos


"rurmlor entflöt, fluppseveri trimel akre wopel larf."
- alte redensart