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Re: To Matt Pearson

From:Matthew Pearson <matthew.pearson@...>
Date:Thursday, October 25, 2001, 19:02
--- Kou wrote:
> Well, human language is rule-governed, pure and simple, so there's got to
be a set of rules in our heads somewhere. Says who? I'm no scientist, but statements like "X is true, so Y *must* be true" (a *hypothesis*) fail the scientific method litmus test, unless one can come up with proof that Y is true ("Apples fall, so oranges must fall." is a hypothesis where we can test if oranges fall.) (As opposed to: Apples fall, I've seen an orange fall, apples and oranges are round, so all oranges *must* fall.)) When *we* were in school :) linguistics profs seemed to want to make linguistics legit as a science (as opposed to a discipline) by using scientific language, but I frequently found the Y part lacking. --- end of quote -- As I understand it, the chain of reasoning is: [a] Language is rule-governed: utterances systematically obey discoverable rules. (This is a hypothesis, of course, but the evidence seems to be strongly in its favour.) [b] Language is in our heads: we have linguistic competence. (I take this as a given; the only alternative is that supernatural creatures are speaking through us. :-)) [c] Given (a) and (b), it follows that there are rules in our heads. I know that this is not a proper syllogism or anything, and it may not strictly follow the scientific method (I know far too little about the history or philosophy of science). But I just can't see how [c] could be a controversial claim. Notice that I've said nothing about *what form* the rules of grammar should take (generative grammar offers one of many ways for stating such rules formally). I've also said nothing about *how* those rules are instantiated in our brains neurologically (generative grammar has little to say about this, but neurolinguists and psychologists have started making some guesses). But that our grammatical competence includes a set of rules, and that these rules are in our brains--somewhere, somehow--strikes me as an entirely straightforward assumption. In Natural Science, no hypothesis that is non-trivial is absolutely provable (and Natural Science of the human mind is even worse, considering how complex and abstract the human mind is). But in practice, most natural scientists seem to implicitly accept a 'threshold of plausibility' in evaluating hypotheses: Once a sufficient amount of evidence has built up which supports a particular hypothesis, that hypothesis is treated *as if it were absolutely proven* and becomes a "fact". Natural selection is an example of a hypothesis which evolutionary biologists treat as a "fact", because the evidence for it is so overwhelming and because no better explanation for that evidence is forthcoming. That human beings have some system of rules of grammar in their heads seems to me to be a "fact" in this same sense. --- beginning of quote ---
> Generative grammar seeks to find out what those rules are. What we
actually *do* with those rules when we speak and understand sentences in real time is, in principle (and in practice), a different issue. While I appreciate that generative (transformational?) grammar seeks to provide us with paradigms to explain grammar rules that we in the here and now can understand cognitively, that is no proof that that is how the mind works. (Processing research sounds intriguing.) (Freudian models are/were useful to explain dreamlife, but trains into tunnels as sexual intercourse, all the rage in their day, seem not so applicable anymore [though I don't think one throws Freud out with the bath water.]) (And was it scientific?). -- end of quote --- As I tried to explain in my earlier response to David, generative grammar is explicitly a theory of knowledge, not a theory of process/behaviour. This is where Chomsky broke ranks with the social science tradition of his day: The behaviourists argued that you couldn't have a theory of knowledge which was scientifically rigorous. Chomsky disagreed, and brought up some pretty convincing counterarguments to the prevailing 'stimulus-and-response' theories of language. But the debate he started is still going on. There are plenty of people around today (mostly biologists and psychologists) who would argue that generative linguistics is no more "scientific" than Freudianism. My hope is that this rift between the materialists and the science-of-mind people will begin to close up as we learn more about the physiology of the brain and the neurological foundations of cognition. But we'll have to see... --- beginning of quote --- (Here again [and I took those notorious Ling101 classes back in the 80s which you referred to]: the premise was that, like a computer, the human mind must use the simplest rules available for language [a specious claim, and far from the scientific method]) if for no other reason than efficiency. I balked, 'cause the "there" transformation made no sense (I often hear the speech 'error' by native speakers, "There's books on the table." but not in the original "core" sentence, "Books are on the table." [the transformation would involve inversion etc.] Then there are sentences like, "Let's go, shall we?" and "Stay, won't you?" which require untold mental gymnastics to find a sequence of transformations that work. (Linguistics prof offered a free "A" to anyone who solved that dilemma). If there's a gaping hole in your theory... --- end of quote --- The absence of a complete account of inversion or eixstential constructions is hardly grounds for abandoning generative grammar (*no* theory has an entirely satisfactory account of these phenomena). And anyway, so what? An incorrect (or inadequate, or unverifiable) hypothesis does not falsify the theory within which that hypothesis is couched. To hold generative syntax to a higher standard of explanatory adequacy than other theories or disciplines--especially considering how young the science of linguistics is--is hardly reasonable. We're working as hard as we can on a very intractable problem! :-) --- beginning of quote --- The field may have come a long way in twenty years, and I would genuinely love to read the next wave of research, but if it takes on the same ol' hubris of "this is the way it is", then I fear "we haven't come a long way, baby."
> This is a very common-sense attitude,
as is: "the mind must work economically, like a computer" (I hope you realize I'm not taking you personally to task for what my prof said 20 years ago) --- end of quote --- Yes, I realise that. The hubris you speak of is--or should be--purely rhetorical. I was taught that the only way to proceed is to make the strongest possible claim you can on the basis of the evidence you have. The stronger your claim is, the easier it is to falsify--and the best theory is the one that's most easily falsified. As a scientist, one is obliged to heed Occam's Razor (and Sherlock Holmes) and assume that the simplest theory which fits all the facts is the correct one. You start with the most straightforward theory possible (e.g., the mind is maximally economical) and work from there. If you start from the assumption that things are complicated--i.e., that a system is more complex than it needs to be, or that it does not operate according to rules, or that it operates according to rules which are ultimately undiscoverable--then there's no way to make scientific progress. Gotta go prepare for class, so I'll end here. Cheers, Matt. Matt Pearson Department of Linguistics Reed College 3203 SE Woodstock Blvd Portland, OR 97202 USA ph: 503-771-1112 (x 7618)

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And Rosta <a.rosta@...>THEORY/CHAT: RE: [CONLANG] To Matt Pearson