Re: antipassives in Tokana (long...)
From: | Tim Smith <timsmith@...> |
Date: | Monday, February 8, 1999, 1:42 |
At 12:10 PM 2/5/99 -0800, Matt Pearson wrote:
>Inspired by yesterday's back-and-forth with Nik Taylor about antipassives
>in Watya'i'sa (sp?), I have decided to add an antipassive construction
>to Tokana. (It makes sense, given that Tokana is supposed to be an
>ergative language.) In the process, I have dropped some other features
>of the language, and changed my understanding of absolutive arguments
>in Tokana. So here's the state of the art:
>[...snip...]
>What do people think?
>
>Matt.
Very interesting! I like it.
As it happens, well before this thread started I was already thinking about
an antipassive construction in my new, still nameless conlang project (the
one about which I posted a rather long discussion of applicatives and
relative clauses a couple of weeks ago). But I'm not sure that
"antipassive" is the appropriate term for what I have in mind. This
language isn't ergative. Does it make sense to talk about an antipassive in
an accusative language? Basically, I found that I needed a construction
that changes a transitive verb to an intransitive one by deleting the
patient, the way a passive construction does so by deleting the agent, and
"antipassive" was the only term I knew that sounded close.
In this language, the verb has a pronominal prefix that specifies the person
and number of the subject (for an intransitive verb) or both the subject and
the primary object (for a transitive verb). The prefix for 3rd-singular
subject is zero; so is the prefix for 3rd-singular subject/3rd-singular
object. Thus, there's no way to distinguish between, for instance, "he/she
saw him/her/it" and "he/she saw" with no object specified, unless the latter
also has a prefix that specifies that there is no object. Would such a
prefix properly be termed "antipassive", or would some other term be better?
-------------------------------------------------
Tim Smith
timsmith@global2000.net
The human mind is inherently fallible. It sees patterns where there is only
random clustering, overestimates and underestimates odds depending on
emotional need, ignores obvious facts that contradict already established
conclusions. Hopes and fears become detailed memories. And absolutely
correct conclusions are drawn from completely inadequate evidence.
- Alexander Jablokov, _Deepdrive_ (Avon Books, 1998, p. 269)