Re: THEORY: [CONLANG] OT Syntax

Marcus:
> On Sat, 25 Nov 2000, And Rosta wrote:
>
> > > Under Stochastic OT, constraints are not in a simple "linear". Each
> > > constraint is a "wave": imagine the one positive peak of a sine wave, and
> > > you get the idea. Each constraint is a separate wave, and they
> overlap. So,
> > > say 10% of the time, Constraint A precedes Constraint B, but the remaining
> > > 90% Constraint B precedes Constraint A. This means that in 10% of the
> > > utterances, the optimal candidate will be determine by A instead of B, but
> > > in the other 90% the candidate faithful to B will win out over the one
> > > faithful to A.
> >
> > For a model of competence, this seems wrong to me. All that matters is that
> > Sentence X and Sentence Y are both grammatical; their frequency in usage is
> > an irrelevance.
>
> But for people who aren't satisfied with mere competence, then frequency
> is a desirable thing to model. Even if you don't like the frequency
> portion, however, it still derives optionality in a principled way.
But a stochastic model is hardly a very explanatory model of usage, which of
course is governed by all sorts of pragmatic, cognitive and processing
factors. As for deriving optionality in a principled way, I don't think the
data requires us to admit optionality to the grammar at all.

> > > But you must admit that quizshow questions are stylistically marked.
> > > Therefore it is not unreasonable to claim that this sylistic aspect has
> > > prevented movement, but in the interpretational portion of the derivation
> > > (LF in a GB grammar, post-Spell-Out in Minimalism), the wh-element does in
> > > fact raise. The typical argument that this is indeed the case is that
> > > quizshow questions are ungrammatical in exactly the same contexts as
> > > wh-fronted questions. In fact, wh-in-situ is what motivated the existance
> > > of LF movement in the first place.
> >
> > I'll admit that quizshow questions are stylistically marked, but I'd be
> > unhappy to admit stylistic markedness as a syntactic feature.
>
> I, on the other hand, don't see the point in keeping syntax and style
> separate.
I'm unusual in accepting (along with the Lord Jim MacCawley) that *sentences*
(as opposed to utterances) do have sociolinguistic and stylistic properties
(which therefore need to be stated in the grammar). But I wouldn't go as
far as to introduce them into syntax as an explanatory structural device.
There seems to be too little call for going down such a conceptually
inelegant route.

> > At any rate, the argument I'd prefer to make is that what is really
> misguided
> > about Minimalism is that there is some kind of default form that is altered
> > only when it violates some constraint or other in the course of a derivation
> > -- that visible movement occurs only when there's something wrong with the
> > version without visible movement.
>
> I find Chomsky's strong claim that all movement is morphologically
> motivated to be the most misguided portion of the theory. I think I can
> show that there is movement in Chickasaw that does not relate to any
> morphological feature at all.
I can't see any Minimalist being persuaded by your counterexample. There are
too many ways of circumventing counterexamples. After all, this is a "program"
not a theory, so it's not even counterexemplifiable yet. The basic tenets
of Minimalism have the status of axioms rather than hypotheses.

> > > Fieldwork is addictive. Pam Munro told me that once, but I didn't believe
> > > her. Now I do.
> >
> > I hate the idea of relying on informants. If you work on English, as I do,
> > you know that the judgements of most people, linguists and nonlinguists
> > alike, are abominably unreliable. It takes the Dwight Bolingers of this
> > world to have the acuity of perception to produce really accurate
> > judgements. (And you don't have to be a native-speaker, either; expert
> > non-native speakers (Ivan Derzhanski-type speakers) tend to make better
> > judgements than natives.)
>
> The inability of native speakers to make reliable judgements has always
> been to me an argument against the type of UG Chomskyans believe in. If we
> do have such highly principled and constrained grammars in our minds, why
> do people disagree about them so much?
Because we don't have uncontaminated introspective access to them. For
everyone their introspection is contaminated by a much more salient awareness
of usage patterns (what is and isn't normally said), and untrained people
probably can't make grammaticality judgements (in contrast to felicity
judgements) at all.

Chomskyan methods have revealed extraordinarily subtle yet elegant structures
at work in syntax, which convinces me that their results are not a kind
of unreal artefact of their methodology.

> > I suppose if you're interested in Bernard Comrie-level description, it
> > doesn't matter. But if you wanted to get embroiled in really really tiny
> > but really really crucial details of binding constraints, say, then it'd
> > be a nightmare.
>
> I have to disagree here. I definitely don't do the Comrie-level work, but
> have had very little difficulty working out such details as whether or not
> Chickasaw verbs raise overtly or not; whether it must have Agr
> projections; if it obeys the binding conditions; etc. Fine, so I can't get
> reliable judgements on such issues as really bizarre binding situations --
> but so what? At this point, theories of syntax only deal well with
> European languages, Japanese, Chinese, and a few others; the languages of
> Africa, America, Australia, and espcially Oceania cannot be adequately
> dealt with. And many of the principles syntacticians hold dear are wrong
> in the larger picture. For example, the Zapotecan languages (as well as
> many "non-configurational" languages) blatantly and frequently violate
> the binding theory (especially Principle C of the GB tradition). What good
> is it to work on the fine details, when the theory we assume does not hold
> cross-linguistically and must be modified?
Here my personal answer is that the problem is with trying to attempt a
universalist theory of language -- one that accounts for language in general.
I would advocate a parochialist approach; you consider each language in
isolation. Yes, it's true that almost all languages are too ill-understood
for us to have reached the level of detail I describe, but if that level of
detail is what you aspire to, then relying on the judgements of others is a
bind.

--And.