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Re: OT: Corpses, etc. (was: Re: Gender in conlangs (was: Re: Umlauts (was Re: Elves and Ill Bethisad)))

From:Christopher Wright <faceloran@...>
Date:Thursday, November 6, 2003, 19:34
Andreas Johansson palsalge
>Quoting John Cowan <cowan@...>: > >> Isidora Zamora scripsit: >> >> > Orthodox Christians do not >> > cremate those who have fallen asleep for this very reason. It's not that >> > God cannot resurrect a body which has been completely destroyed, as by >> > modern methods of cremation, because He can, but it is shows disrespect to >> > God to go to a great deal of trouble to destroy something that you know He >> > is planning to use again. >> >> It will be destroyed in any event, unless the general resurrection comes >> within a century or so. > >This reminds me of one of the less convincing "proofs" that Christianity must >be false I've heard; a guy argued that the general resurrection would be an >extremely messy affair, since alot of atoms are going to belong to multiple >people's bodies. That, in turn, reminded me of Feynman's suggestion that all >electrons are _one_ electron, which goes back and forth in time (much like >Marvin!). But back on the previous OT track, what this rises is the question >in what sense my body on two different occasion is "the same" (particularly if >I've been cremated and resurrected in between!). The actual material >components of a body are not normally considered important for this kind of >identity - over the last year, a big proportion of the atoms in my body has >been replaced, but no-one would say I've acquired a new body in the process. I >can see no other conclusion that the identity - and there must be an identity, >if resurrection is to mean anything, and this whole discussion of course >presupposes it does - rests rather in the "structure" or "organization" of the >body. But that is pretty fundamentally altered at death - I do not think what >it would be controversal to define the death of a multicellular creature as >the cessation of the entire-body level organization. What all this leads to is >the question if cremating my body makes it meaningfully less "me" than simple >death. > >It of course also ties in to the sometimes advanced idea that after-life >really is a simulation of sorts - if the structure/organization is the >important thing, it makes little difference if it's realized as electrons in >God's laptop* or an as actual material body. Which raises the counterquestions >i) who's to say the present life isn't a simulation too, and ii) what exactly >is the difference between a simulation and a "reality"; both consist of a >number of elements interacting according to some rules.
It's simpler than that. You take any movement paradox you like and add the caveat that time comes in discrete amounts--it's digital rather than analog. Then you get many universes, each made of one "frame" of time. You get a new universe every time. Thus, there are two methods of resurrecting people in their own bodies: 1) Forge them. Just make new ones. Does the difference really matter? I've had a billion times a billion bodies just writing this message. 2) Yank them out of an unused universe. Since that frame's already been experienced, who needs it?


Andreas Johansson <andjo@...>