Re: Non-Explanations (was Moraic codes)

Jim Grossmann scripsit:

> Perhaps I can elucidate.   Consider Yehudi, the spirit who turns the light
> on and off when you open and close the refrigerator door.
Just so.

I would also point to early (unconstrained) TG, whose problem was that
everything could be explained by PS rules and transformations.

> In discussions of theories of the mind, this kind of non-explanatory
> explanation is more subtle and difficult to detect, because we can't yet map
> specific neuronal activity onto specific thoughts.   For example, we don't
> have a 3-D cyto-electro-chemical map of the thought "I don't like the way
> people cut poodles' hair."
To be fair, though, there is no particular evidence that we will ever be
able to do that.  For example, it might be the case that when I think of
Vienna, this is because my brain is in state A, whereas when you think of
Vienna, this is because your brain is in state B, with no hope of identifying
or even mapping A to B.  I believe it is Davidson who calls this "anomalous
monism": thoughts are physical phenomena (no dualism), but there is
no rule (nomos) for saying which physical phenomena they are.

--
John Cowan                                   cowan@ccil.org
One art/there is/no less/no more/All things/to do/with sparks/galore
        --Douglas Hofstadter

Reply