Re: SemiOT: Revealing your conlanger status, personal experiences of reaction...

On 18 June, Sally Caves wrote:

> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "John Leland" <Lelandconlang@...>
>
> > In a message dated 6/16/04 12:23:06 PM Pacific Daylight Time,
> > joerg_rhiemeier@WEB.DE writes:
> >
> > << When I mentioned it in his presence, he said that
> >  what I am doing was meaningless because Wittgenstein said that
> >  "private languages are impossible".  I am not an expert on
> >  Wittgenstein's philosophy, but I think my brother has interpreted
> >  Wittgenstein's words wrongly.  What Wittgenstein meant was, I think,
> >  that a language can never be private in the sense that no-one else
> >  can learn it.  Conlangs thus *aren't* "private languages". >>
>
> Here's something I quoted from Wittgenstein:
>
> Could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or
give
> vocal expression to his inner experiences -- his feelings, moods, and the
> rest -- for his private use? Well, can't we do so in our ordinary
> language? -- But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this
> language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to
> his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the
> language. -- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations par. 243
>
> Wittgenstein calls a "private language" that which has no circulation in
the
> real world, or which cannot be used as a means of communication with
another
> person, because it is made up of words that refer only to the speaker's
> PRIVATE and idiosyncratic experiences and sensations.  Since language is a
> public consensus, using words that are agreed upon publically to express
> even private feeling, then a private language is an impossibility.  The
way
> we relate to each other, the way we know red is called "red" or nausea is
> called "nausea" is through a common use of language which is an imprecise,
> BECAUSE public, symbology of our inner feelings.  Wittgenstein, I believe,
> is trying to argue against solipsism, the belief that the self is the only
> thing that has reality.  He's popular, because so much contemporary
> metaphysics and philosophy of language (Nietzsche, Judith Butler) argue
the
> opposite, that self is created BY language.  Or that self doesn't exist or
> can't be gauged.  A thorny issue.
    I am having a problem with the idea of a polarized division of a
person's linguistic actions. Either public or private, no in-between.
Speaking as a speech-language-pathologist:
in practical terms, if I come across a person who is making noises with his
vocal apparatus that mean nothing to me, (and believe me, I have!)
and he seems to be satisfied with the results,  how do I know that I am in
the presence of a "private lang" and not a confused, psychotic, or aphasic
person?
    If he uses the sounds to relate to me, such as showing me pictures that
more or less have something to do with a certain sound-sequence of his
"private" speech, it's already not so "private".
And what happens if I were to "adopt" his sounds to signify my own personal
sensations and he were not to object to that. Would his lang be becoming
public? Would he still retain a "private" lang?
    And could I, though therapy, _force_ a public meaning upon his private
sounds
(not that I would --- I'm not so sure as to how ethical it would be!),
would he still have a private lang?
And what if I taped all his utterances over a long span of time
(in order to get a good sample of his speech in diverse situations)
and then, without his consent, or even knowledge,
created a publicly shared conlang based upon the lang sample ---
would it be the same lang? What would you call a lang that
has the exact same apparent phonology and morphosyntax as another lang,
but with absolutely no words sharing a common meaning?
    Why I bring all this up, is that it reminds me of what I do all the time
in my work.
    For example, when teaching a word to a kid who has no lang whatsoever,
let's say that I teach him the sound sequence [kise],
which is Hebrew for "chair".
What else do I teach him? I surely don't teach him all the possible types of
chairs that exist today, let alone all the types of seats that have been
used by all peoples throughout all time! I don't teach him all the private
associations that I have accumulated over the years to the idea of "chair",
including all my personal memories of a few particularly comfortable chairs
(and some not so comfortable seats I had to endure in high school ! ;-)   )
It's actually amazing how _little_ information I impart to him about [kise]
before I turn to the next word, resting assured that he can use it
whenever he needs to in public or private.
At first, I know what he knows because I put it there, so it's more or less
totally public.  But from then on, how do I know what private associations
he'll form with that word? I guess what I am trying to say is, IMHO,
all lang-use by people, whether natlang or conlang, is a continuum,
with a private aspect at one extreme  _and_ a public one at the other!
How much must this continuum be wieghted towards shared use in order
to describe the person's utterances as public?
And the resverse: how much must the continuum be weighted towards
idiosyncratic and "non-sharedness" for it to be described as private?
    A thorny issue indeed!


Dan Sulani
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likehsna rtem zuv tikuhnuh auag inuvuz vaka'a.

A word is an awesome thing.

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