Re: In defence of philosophical languages (was: RE: Comparison of philosophical
From: | And Rosta <a.rosta@...> |
Date: | Wednesday, January 22, 2003, 2:23 |
Bryan Maloney:
> --- In conlang@yahoogroups.com, And Rosta <a.rosta@L...> wrote:
> > Differences between things, such as carrots and potatoes, need to
> > be reflected in wordshape by phonological differences that reflect
> > the unconfusability of carrots and potatoes. But at the same time,
> > there are reasons for wanting to have words with similar or related
> > meaning have similar or related sound. One reason is that an iconic
> > map of conceptual space is a better (more faithful) map. Another
>
> Can you demonstate that, in real-world usage by a broad population,
> this model is necessarily "better" than the means used by natural
> languages--taking into account Wittgenstein II's conclusions regarding
> epistemology and language, of course?
I think it is fairly well-established that iconicity is a functional
attractor. That is, in functionalist explanations of why languages
are the way they are, iconicity is an important explanatory factor.
I can't cite a specific text, since it's not my field, but I would
have thought that looking 'iconicity' up in the index of a textbook
on functional linguistics would do the trick.
> > reason is that the iconicity makes the language easier to learn
>
> Natural languages seem to be sufficiently easy to learn. All three of
> my children have learned/are learning two--English at home and
> Spanglish at school for the older two and English and ASL for the
> youngest (no, he's not hearing-impaired, he picks it up from some
> other kids at his daycare)
I don't find any languages easy to learn. And in conlangs you can
simplify and regularize the grammar, but learning the vocab
remains a major hurdle. I do find that regularities and patternings
in vocab make it easier to learn. If you don't, and don't believe
that people generally do, you could try asking Peter to poll
conlangers on whether they do.
> > in sets like {north, south}, {east, west}, {female, male}, {dog,
> > hog, frog, polliwog (tadpole)}
>
> And what about right/wrong, good/bad, boy/girl, pig/horse/cow/chicken?
> My youngest isn't even two years old and he recognizes boy/girl,
> pig/horse/cow/chicken. Your claim of ease may be true, but it also
> appears to be irrelevant
I don't see how you reach that conclusion. I don't doubt the considerable
linguistic abilities of your child, but I don't see how they bear on
the reasons I gave for not dismissing (certain sorts of) philosophical
languages as a variety of conlang founded on a fundamentally flawed
premise (which is what Sally said, reporting the received wisdom).
> > * Words with similar/related meanings should in shape be half
> > similar and half different. But the different half may be similar
> > to other words related in a different way. For example, the
> > shape of the word for carrot might have a tubery component in
> > common with the word for potato, and an orangey component in
>
> Ah, but carrots are not tubers! Carrot should have a "rooty"
> component.
Okay, though tubery would do for me, since to me tubers and root
vegetables are the same.
> It should also have a "nightshady" component. Likewise,
> it should have a "grows in temperate climates component". It should
> also have a "requires loose soil" and "annual plant" component
> Eventually, we have a word with so many necessary components that it
> becomes simply unwieldy. Oh, but wait, more components: It should
> have appropriate culinary components, too!
Why? Its oranginess and rootiness are its most salient properties.
We're trying to map conceptual space here, not objective reality.
The idea is not that the wordshape should give you the equivalent
of an encyclopedia article on carrots. The idea is that the wordshape
should be redolent of carrotiness.
--And.
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