Re: KuJomu - the writing

En réponse à Wesley Parish <wes.parish@...>:

>
> Ie: What is the "you" doing the doubting, the thinking?
The thinker himself. The "you" *is defined* by the thinking. There's no
other "you" than the "thinking you", since anything else has been wiped out by
doubt and the inability to prove the existence of those things.

  Theravada
> Buddhism
> postulated that the "psyche" the "soul" had separate strands making it
> up,
> and following death, those strands separated and went their individual
> way -
> or at least one set of Theravada Buddhists did, and I've even managed to
> read
> some of the Pali text!
The problem in that is that the separate pieces of the "soul" are *postulated*
without being proven, and thus can be denied by reasonable doubt! The whole
point of Descartes in the first Meditation is to doubt everything which can be
doubted, until he finds something which cannot be doubted anymore, a
stable "stone" on which he can build the rest of his philosophy, without adding
any doubtful postulate. This stone is that while doubting of everything, he
cannot doubt of his own existence. As for *what* is this "self", the only thing
that defines it *at this point of the demonstration* is its ability to think.
So this "self" is defined as a thinking self, and that's all it is defined as!
Whether it is material or not, whether it is only part of the psyche of someone
or not is irrelevant *at this time of the discussion*, since anything else *but
this thinking self* has been thrown away by reasonable doubt!

  Marvin Minsky, of MIT Artificial Intelligence
> Labs,
> postulated that human intelligence was organized in modules of
> interacting
> sections of the brain.  As far as I know - and I stopped reading
> neuroscience
> textbooks about 1989, as soon as I regarded myself as "sufficiently
> recovered" from my TBI - inaccurate self-diagnosis! <;^(   - that is
> precisely how the brain is recognised as functioning by modern
> neuroscientists.
>
There again, you have a postulate, and a postulate which presupposes the
existence of brains, of a body, of a world, etc... Those things are all thrown
away by Descartes at first, since reasonable doubt can deny them (who says they
are not illusions of our senses? There are six meditations in Descartes's book,
and only at the last one he will finally "prove" that the world does indeed
exist), and thus cannot be used when trying to define this thinking self.
This "ego", whose existence is undoubtful, is defined by the only fact that
it's thinking. Its nature is not postulated. It is not known at this point
whether it is the only part of the psyche! It is known only to be the only
undoubtful thing, whatever its nature! Descartes will get to the nature of this
thinking self only at the third meditation, so trying to define it already is
prematurate, whatever the Buddhists or Mr. Minsky say. As you said, they
*postulate* those things, and they can be doubted. The whole point of Descartes
is to take as postulate for his philosophy only what cannot be doubted. And
what cannot be doubted is the existence of an "ego" who is thinking, whatever
the nature of that ego.

>
> But if the "you" the identity that is doing the thinking, the doubting,
> is a
> conglomerate of interacting processes, and there is some core
> neurophysiological damage, or some inequal distribution of essential
> neurophysical chemistry, then surely the core identity can come unstuck.
But the question is not there. At the moment Descartes comes to the conclusion
that he cannot doubt his own thinking, anything else, *including his body*, has
been doubted away. Everything you're talking about is unapplicable *at this
point*! Descartes comes to the conclusion that he cannot deny his identity as a
thinking one, but that is *all*. He cannot go further than that (yet). And
especially he cannot define this identity better than as a thinking identity.
And remember also that at this point of the discussion it's only valid for
himself. Anybody else has been doubted away as possible illusions.

>  In
> those cases, it's not so much a denial of existence, it is a denial of
> the
> validity of decisions and conclusions that that factured identity may
> come
> to.
>
I must asmit I don't understand what you've just written. But I can tell you
one thing: it's unapplicable in the thought of Descartes, because what you do
is bringing things that have already been doubted away. When Descartes
says: "cogito, sum", he just says that the only undoubtful thing is that he
exists, and he exists as a thinking being. He *cannot* know anything else at
that point. And the nature of this thinking thing *cannot* be known yet. You
can disagree on what Descartes says later on in the first next meditations (I
do, as soon as the second one), but the result of the first meditation is
undoubtful. You cannot reasonably doubt your own existence as a thinking being,
and the nature of this being is to be thinking, period. Anything else has been
doubted away at that point.

>
> Fine, except of course, what about the amoeba?
What? At this point of the discussion, there is no such thing as an amoeba.
Their existence has been doubted away.

  "If a tree falls in the
> forest
> without a listener, does it make a sound?"  "If a man is alone in the
> forest
> when he says something, is he still wrong?"
>
Those things are inapplicable *at the point of the discussion when Descartes
enunciates the cogito*. The cogito is enunciated at a moment of the discussion
when anything else has been doubted away, and thus *for now* cannot be used in
the discussion.

>
> Always good to discuss philosophy!  Bon appetit!
>
Yes indeed! But I just have one critique on what you say: like most adversaries
of Descartes at his time, you don't follow his path, and try to contradict him
with inapplicable things *at the point of the discussion you are trying to
contradict*. Any of the next five meditations of Descartes contain points which
can be contradicted (despite Descartes's claim). But that's not the case of his
first meditation, since its message is simply: when I begin to doubt the
existence of everything, the world, other people, animals, even my own body, I
can never doubt my own existence, *whatever the nature of this existence*
(something which *cannot* be known at that time. It cannot even be known
whether it existed before or whether it will carry on existing, or whether it
was built in some way, since even time itself has been doubted away), my own
existence as a doubting, and thus thinking being. This statement is
uncontradictable because it is valid *only* for the one who states it. It is
solipsism in its purest form. Any try at contradicting it involves adding
postulates and/or statements that have *at this point of the discussion* no
value, since they can be doubted. Only later will Descartes be able to prove
the existence of his body, and then of the outside world, including anybody
else (and this part of the demonstration is a part which can be discussed and
contradicted).

Christophe.

http://rainbow.conlang.free.fr

Take your life as a movie: do not let anybody else play the leading role.